DEDICATION:

This blog is dedicated to "The Children Left Behind." We will not rest until the safety of our children and those that are entrusted with their mental health care are held accountable for abusing the children's God given rights, those rights upheld by our constitution, and those that have been complicit in obfuscating the truth!

Thursday, September 29, 2011

WWASPS FORMER LAWSUIT DECISION - DISMISSED - WRONG JUDICIAL VENUE



Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
WILLIAM CHASE WOOD, et al.,
Plaintiffs, ORDER and
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
WORLD WIDE ASSOCIATION OF
SPECIALTY PROGRAMS AND
SCHOOLS, INC., et al.,
Case No. 2:06-CV-708 CW
Defendants.
The present action is complicated; there can be no question about that, and the
allegations, if true, involve serious misconduct that deserves to be addressed. The issue raised by
these motions, however, is whether the Plaintiffs have selected the right judicial forum in which
to seek redress. The court concludes that they have not and the complaint must be dismissed.
The Plaintiffs are 350 parents and children who bring this action against about 60
Defendants. The Plaintiffs have made repeated attempts to successfully plead a federal cause of
action and the present operative complaint, entitled the “Sixth Amended Complaint,” is nearly
3,000 pages long. The Plaintiffs filed this action filed nearly five years ago and have faced a
barrage of motions, to which they have responded by adding an ever changing and growing
number of parties and asserting shifting legal theories and arguments. The court granted
Plaintiffs the opportunity for yet another amendment, but clearly warned the Plaintiffs that the



Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 2 of 14
Sixth Amended Complaint would be their last opportunity to state a viable federal claim. The
Plaintiffs have failed and this Order is the end of the line for this case in this court.
As a brief factual background, the Defendants are individuals, corporate entities, and
schools that were generally in the business of providing services to troubled teens and/or support
services to each other. Generally, the Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the proposition that the
Defendants engaged in a scheme to bait and switch the unsuspecting Plaintiffs by convincing
desperate parents of troubled youths to send their children to what were represented to be
educational facilities specializing in improving the students’ behavior. To avail themselves of
this supposed behavior modifying education, the parents were required to pay large up-front and
monthly costs for preliminary services and tuition. The Plaintiffs allege, however, that the
services were a sham and the supposed schools were essentially gulags staffed by abusive and
incompetent people. The Plaintiffs allege the students were subjected to horrific treatment which
the Defendants covered up by feeding the parents continuous lies about the true nature of what
was happening to their children. The Plaintiffs further contend that although government
authorities would occasionally discover the true nature of a school and close that school, the
Defendants would simply open new schools or shift students to already existing schools that had
escaped shut down. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’ efforts to conceal the scheme
included paying hush money to critics and the media and filing bogus claims against parents who
complained or brought actions against them. The Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants
financed the scheme by skimming off service fees and tuition, which ensured that the schools
that were meant to receive that money were not be properly funded. The Plaintiffs allege that the
scheme operated between 1995 and 2007, with wrongful activities beginning as early as 1994.
2
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 2 of 14
The Plaintiffs assert a variety of causes of action arising from the alleged wrongful
conduct and have divided themselves into “Parent Plaintiffs” and “Student Plaintiffs.” The
Parent Plaintiffs assert state law claims mostly related to their claims that the Defendants
defrauded them by convincing them to send their children to the relevant schools and the alleged
continuing fraud perpetuated to keep the children there. The Student Plaintiffs assert state law
intentional tort claims mostly related to their allegedly abusive and inhumane treatment at the
schools. The Plaintiffs assert federal court jurisdiction in the first instance based on their attempt
to plead a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. All Plaintiffs attempt to plead the RICO claims against all Defendants. As
a secondary position, the Plaintiffs claim that they can meet the requirements for diversity
jurisdiction by dismissing claims of the non-diverse parents and children.
On the Plaintiffs’ motion, the court designated this action as complex. As its initial
ruling on complex procedure, the court ordered that before it could decide the multiple
outstanding motions by various Defendants to dismiss on various grounds, it must first
determine whether it has original jurisdiction in this action and requested briefing on this issue.
The Defendants responded by filing a joint motion to dismiss, arguing that the Plaintiffs have
failed to state a viable RICO claim and that diversity is not present. The Plaintiffs argued for
original federal jurisdiction based on their RICO claims and argued that in any event they should
be allowed to amend the complaint to satisfy the diversity requirements. For the reasons stated
below, the court GRANTS the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the RICO claim. Moreover, the
court concludes that it does not have diversity jurisdiction. Finally, the court will not entertain
any further motions to amend the complaint. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED in its
3
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 3 of 14
entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS
I. RICO ClaimsThe Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have violated subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d) of
18 U.S.C. § 1962. The Defendants argue that the complaint fails to state a claim for any of these
causes of action. The court agrees with the Defendants. Because the Plaintiffs have not stated a
valid RICO claim under any of these sections, the court does not have federal question
jurisdiction in this action.A. Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all
well-pleaded factual allegations. Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002).
Courts must also view all facts alleged in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as the nonmoving
parties. Id. Nevertheless, the court “need not accept . . . conclusory allegations without
supporting factual averments.” Southern Disposal, Inc., v. Texas Waste, 161 F.3d 1259, 1262
(10th Cir. 1998). Court must, however, keep in mind that is “function on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess
whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may
be granted.” Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991).
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must provide
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cohon ex rel. Bass v. New, __ F.3d __ , 2011 WL 1746203, * 5 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v., 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). The Twombly Court further elaborated that to do so,
Mexico
Twombly
4
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 4 of 14
plaintiffs must “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 547. The application of this pleading requirement to all civil cases was affirmed in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
The Plaintiffs have generally asserted that all Defendants have violated Section 1962(a).
Section 1962(a), however, prohibits only “principals” from using or investing income from
racketeering activity in the acquisition, establishment or operation of any enterprise affecting
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). In the Sixth Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs name
only Defendants Robert B. Lichfield, Patricia E. Lichfield and Brent M. Facer as principals. As
plead, the court must assume that notwithstanding the generalized and conclusory allegations
attempting to include all Defendants, the Plaintiffs’ Section 1962(a) count is limited to claims
against the Litchfields and Mr. Facer.1
To show standing to bring a RICO claim under Section 1962(a), a plaintiff “must plead
facts tending to show that he was injured by the use or investment of racketeering income.”
Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.
sustained by a plaintiff must have been “proximately caused by the RICO violation.” Bixler v., 596 F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). As recently explained by the
Foster
Supreme Court, “proximate cause [for RICO purposes] requires ‘some direct relation between
the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. A link that is ‘too remote,’ ‘purely
contingent,’ or ‘indirec[t]’ is insufficient.” Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, N.Y., 130 S.
1 In any event, as made clear below, the question of who the principals are is not
dispositive of this claim.
5
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 5 of 14
Ct. 983, 989 (2010) (citation omitted).
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have not plead that the principal Defendants’
prohibited use or investment of racketeering income caused them harm. The Defendants
acknowledge that the Plaintiffs allege that the principals invested proceeds from their activities
into schools and related entities that formed the alleged enterprise, but argue that the court must
disregard such allegations because the allegations of harm are merely conclusory and formulaic.
They argue that the Plaintiffs fail to plead any facts to support these conclusory allegations.
The Plaintiffs respond that their complaint adequately demonstrates that the principals’
unlawful use and investment lead to the harms the Plaintiffs suffered. Generally, the Plaintiffs
argue that without the investments made by the principals, the Defendants would not have been
able to engage in tactics necessary to cover up the scheme, such as opening new schools and
forming new entities when the old ones were shut down. Without such investments, the
Plaintiffs argue, they would not have made further payments or would not have suffered further
harms. Thus, the Plaintiffs maintain, the principals’ unlawful use or investment of income made
it possible for the Plaintiffs to be defrauded and otherwise damaged.
On this issue, the Defendants prevail. Based on the allegations of the complaint, the court
could infer that some of the Plaintiffs may have suffered injuries proximately caused by the fact
that the Litchfields and Mr. Facer used or invested alleged racketeering income in a manner
prohibited by Section 1962(a). The analysis, however, does not stop there. Because the
Plaintiffs have not plead as a class, each separate Plaintiff must plead facts that plausibly support
the conclusion that he or she in particular was harmed by the principals’ prohibited use or
investment of income.
6
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 6 of 14
The Plaintiffs do not plead facts to support such a conclusion. While it is conceivable
that some Plaintiffs could have suffered harm proximately caused by principals’ allegedly
unlawful use or investment of income, none of the Plaintiffs has attempted to allege or argue how
he or she in particular was so harmed. Rather, the Plaintiffs plead harm only in a global and
general sense and argue harm as to all Plaintiffs in their memorandum in opposition to the
motion to dismiss.
This conclusory pleading and overly generalized argument do not suffice. The Plaintiffs
must allege facts that would support at least a reasonable inference to support the jump from the
general proposition that Defendants’ wrongful use and investment could have caused harm in an
overall sense to the more specific conclusion that such activities plausibly were the proximate
cause of harm to each Plaintiff. The factual allegations in the complaint, however, offer no
plausible support for such a leap. The complaint includes claims by hundreds of Plaintiffs who
allege harm by dozens of Defendants in a time period spanning over a decade. A theory of
proximate cause could conceivably be formed for any given Plaintiff. Instead of offering such a
theory, however, the Plaintiffs rely on conclusory pleading of harm related to general aspects of
the overall scheme. In light of the requirement that a plaintiff plead facts sufficient to support an
articulated proximate harm, these allegations are insufficient for the court to conclude that any
Plaintiff has standing under Section 1962(a).
Because none of the Plaintiffs has alleged facts that plausibly support a conclusion that he
or she was proximately harmed by activities prohibited by Section 1962(a), that claim fails for all
of the Plaintiffs.
7
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 7 of 14
C. Claims Under Section 1962(b)“[I]n order to allege injury ‘by reason of’ section 1962(b), a RICO plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendants’ acquisition or control of an interstate enterprise injured the
plaintiff.” Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 716 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (aff’d,
976 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1992)). See also Bixler, 596 F.3d at 756 (“A plaintiff has standing only
if his injuries were proximately caused by the RICO violation.”) (citation omitted).
In the Sixth Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs may have successfully alleged that some
of the Defendants acquired an interest in or control of an enterprise. Even assuming that this
requirement is met, however, the Plaintiffs’ claim under Section 1962(b) fails for two reasons.
First, the Plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing how such acquisition or control itself could
plausibly have harmed any of them. Moreover, as with the Section 1962(a) claim, even if it were
conceivable that the relevant acquisition and control could have harmed some or even many of
Plaintiffs, none of the Plaintiffs have alleged how he or she in particular was harmed. Nor is
there any trustworthy way for a fact finder to make the leap from general, potential harm to
actual, particularized harm. For these reasons, the Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts sufficient
for the court to conclude that they have standing to make their claim under Section 1962(b).D. Claims Under Section 1962(c)
To plead a claim under Section 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege that a defendant (1)
participated in the conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.
Tal v. Hogan
8
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 8 of 14
have failed on each of these four requirements.2 The court need not address each element in this
case, however, because the Plaintiffs have failed to properly plead an enterprise that is separate
and distinct from the Defendants.
As explained by the Tenth Circuit in Brannon v. Boatmen’s First Nat’l Bank of Ok., 153
F.3d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), “the defendant ‘person’ must be an entity
distinct from the alleged ‘enterprise.’” While this distinction might appear to be somewhat
technical, it is actually critical, because RICO liability “depends on showing that the defendants
conducted or participated in the conduct of the ‘enterprise’s affairs,’ not just their own affairs.”
Reves v. Ernst & Young
In the Sixth Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the RICO claims are asserted
against “all named Defendants.” (Sixth Am. Compl. at VII.2, Dkt. No. 408 at p. 74.) The
Plaintiffs further allege that the “enterprise” for purposes of the RICO claims is the “WWASPS
Enterprise.” (Id. at VII.6, p. 76.) Finally, the Plaintiffs define the “WWASPS Enterprise” as
“the Defendants named herein, acting jointly to accomplish their common objective, as described
in this Complaint.” (Id. at IV.2, p. 53.) Simply put, the Plaintiffs have not plead facts sufficient
to distinguish between the RICO “persons” and the RICO “enterprise.” To the contrary, the
complaint clearly asserts that the “persons” and the “enterprise” are one and the same: both are
made up of all of the Defendants. There are not facts to support even an inference that the joint
actions of the Defendants were carried out through a separate and distinct entity that could
constitute a RICO enterprise. Under Brannon and Reves, such allegations do not plead an
2 The Defendants also argue that the alleged harms to the student Plaintiffs cannot be
recovered under RICO. The court need not reach this issue.
9
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 9 of 14
“enterprise” under Section 1962(c). Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to plead such a claim.
E. Claims Under Section 1962(d)Finally, as explained by the Tenth Circuit, “[i]f a plaintiff has no viable claim under §
1962(a), (b), or (c), then its subsection (d) conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law.” Tal, 453
F.3d at 1270. Here, as explained above, the Plaintiffs have not shown that they have standing
under Section 1962(a) and (b) and not sufficiently plead an enterprise under Section 1962(c).
Accordingly, their Section 1962(d) claim fails.II. Diversity Jurisdiction
In the Sixth Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs attempt a highly unusual approach to
claim diversity jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs concede that there is no diversity jurisdiction on the
face of the complaint and assert federal question jurisdiction. They continue, however, that if the
RICO claims are dismissed, thirteen clearly non-diverse Plaintiffs “shall be voluntarily dismissed
without prejudice from the case, so that complete diversity may be preserved.” (Sixth Am.
Compl. at II.3, Dkt. No. 408 at p. 51.)3 The Plaintiffs further state that if the RICO claims are
dismissed, they will also dismiss several clearly non-diverse Defendants who were previously
dismissed from this action for lack of personal jurisdiction over them.
It is true that Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “‘invests district courts with
authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time [to preserve diversity
3 Like the Defendants, the court is concerned that counsel’s suggesting this course of
action could be a breach of counsel’s ethical duties to the Plaintiffs. Ultimately, however, the
core issue for this court to decide is whether the proposed dropping of parties will be allowed and
the question of attorney ethics is tangential to that question. In any event, there are other, more
appropriate forums for deciding whether the Plaintiffs’ attorneys have lived up to their
professional duties in this case.
10
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 10 of 14
jurisdiction], even after judgment has been rendered.’” Lenon v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 136
F.3d 1365, 1371 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S.
826, 832 (1989), citations omitted). Nevertheless, whether the court should allow a party to be
dropped to preserve diversity is left to the discretion of the court. See Lenon, 136 F.3d at 1369.
In this case, the court declines to exercise its discretionary power to allow the non-diverse
parties to be voluntarily dismissed to preserve jurisdiction. First, and critically, the Plaintiffs
have made no attempt to argue why the non-diverse parties are dispensable. While the court
could envision arguments both in favor and in opposition to allowing some plaintiffs to be
dismissed, it is not the court’s responsibility to speculate as to whether those parties are
dispensable or not.
Moreover, the practical effect of allowing the Plaintiffs’ attempt at forum shopping is to
create a single action which involves the disparate claims of hundreds of Plaintiffs against dozens
of Defendants. This case has not been certified as a class action and there is no indication that
Plaintiffs intend to seek such certification. It is therefore probable that even if there were
complete diversity of citizenship among the parties, this action would eventually be severed into
various actions and possibly even one action per Plaintiff. By requiring the Plaintiffs to try again
together elsewhere or bring their claims separately, the court is simply speeding up the seemingly
inevitable division of this action and more quickly bringing the Plaintiffs’ claims to resolution.
Further, even if the court were inclined to allow the clearly non-diverse parties to be
dropped, the citizenship of all the remaining parties is still not entirely clear. The Plaintiffs assert
that every party’s citizenship can be established by reference to the Sixth Amended Complaint
and to the supplemental exhibits attached to their briefing. The court cannot definitively confirm
11
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 11 of 14
this assertion.
The main problem in this regard is determining the citizenship of the Defendants who are
limited liability companies, partnerships, and other non-incorporated entities. The Plaintiffs
maintain that they have named and alleged the citizenship of all known partners and members of
such Defendants. But by the wording of this statement, the Plaintiffs essentially concede that
they are not sure if there are other partners and members of the relevant Defendants. Defendant
Sky View Academy is the most glaring example of why having complete citizenship information
is crucial here. For Sky View Academy, the Plaintiffs state that rather than allege the citizenship
of any member, they have alleged the citizenship of “the only officer provided by the Nevada
Secretary of State.” (Pls.’ Memo. in Opp. at p. 28, n. 102, Dkt. No. 477 at p. 38.) For this
Defendant, then, the court has no way of knowing whether any member is non-diverse, since the
officer may or may not be a member. Beyond Plaintiffs’ general assertions that they have
researched various sources for information about members and partners, they do not assert that
their allegations with respect to these kinds of Defendants are necessarily complete.
The Plaintiffs’ proposed solution to this problem is to wait for possible future non-diverse
partners or members to come forward and raise jurisdictional challenges at some point in the
future. This approach is unacceptable because subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time. As such, years of effort in this complicated case could be mooted as soon as a single
member or partner of a single Defendant realizes that he or she is non-diverse and moves to
dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.III. Leave to Amend
The court has previously stated that it will not entertain any further motions to amend the
12
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 12 of 14
complaint. The court remains firm in this resolve. First and most importantly, the court made it
clear to the Plaintiffs that the Sixth Amended Complaint was to be their final opportunity to
make their best effort at pleading jurisdiction. Moreover, the court finds that further attempts at
amending will not be beneficial to the parties in this case, nor are such attempts likely to move
the parties past the motion to dismiss phase any time soon. For example, even if the Plaintiffs
were to use this Order as a guide to amend their RICO claims, the court has only focused on one
fatal flaw per subsection. The court took this route not as an indication that there were no other
problems with the RICO claims, but because taking the time to fully evaluate every aspect of the
RICO claims would have unnecessarily added time to these already drawn out proceedings.
More attempts to plead RICO, then, would only lead to more motions to dismiss, and the court
would be remiss not to fully consider those motions. Additionally, various Defendants have
made various other motions, including motions to dismiss and motions to sever, that appear on
their face to be worthy of serious consideration. Those motions will not be mooted by further
efforts to successfully plead a RICO claim or diversity jurisdiction and will need to be resolved
even if such efforts were successful.
By dismissing this case, the court does not mean to minimize the seriousness of the
allegations made in the Sixth Amended Complaint. If those allegations are true, the Plaintiffs
here were subjected to treatment that nobody deserves to suffer. But based on the allegations of
the Sixth Amended Complaint, this court simply does not have the jurisdiction to hear this case.CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The case is therefore CLOSED. The parties shall bear their own fees and costs.
13
Case 2:06-cv-00708-CW Document 500 Filed 08/02/11 Page 13 of 14
SO ORDERED this 2nd day of August, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Clark Waddoups
United States District Judge
14
, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993).
, 453 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006). The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs
, 868 F.2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir. 1989). In particular, the injury
556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).B. Claims Under Section 1962(a)

WWASPS LAWSUIT BY FORMER STUDENTS - IECA EDUCATIONAL CONSULTANTS AND OVERSEAS PLACEMENTS

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/09/world-wide-association-of_n_955459.html


Thought this was interesting,  sound like another facility or too many to count?

 "Also named are a network of nearly 50 other affiliated businesses and individuals, which the lawsuit claims were also controlled by the organization's principals through either family relationships or written management agreements."

After reading about another WWASPS lawsuit - the mention of Costa Rica rang another horrid bell, where, like Mexico,  human rights violations were rampant among children in their country's care.  Apparently, this fact has not been driven home.

IECA Educational Consultants  are still recommending Costa Rica and other abroad facilities ... ethics anyone?  Recently, it was disclosed that amongst the recommendations given by an educational consultant - Costa Rica was up there in the hit parade. 

"In court papers, attorneys for the students say World Wide has operated more than 20 schools in seven states and in Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Samoa and the Czech Republic, although the exact number and how many remain in operation is unclear."

Implementing something parallel to the provision in the "The Higher Education Act " would be a start for curtailing unethical educational consultants from recommending overseas placements, where compensation is paid by these facilities for placements in a so-called "Therapeutic Boarding School."   These are vulnerable children sent overseas to the custody of whom and what?  Have you all lost your minds? It may be an "ethical breach" considered by IECA to accept bounties for children's heads, but, hey, who is going to come forward? 

 IECA and NATSAP are associations and frequently disparaged by the educational consultants themselves.  The associations do not police their own.  They protect each other or are afraid to speak up for fear of being ostracized and losing their livelihood.  However, what is ones 'pork' worth, if it's blood money.  It is extremely difficult to understand how one could possibly convince themselves they are offering a just service. If the case were the opposite, places like Hidden Lake Academy, the Ridge Creek School facility, and the worse of the lot out there would have been history long ago.  It is a multi, multi-billion dollar industry that was allowed to flourish without any checks and balances, which leads to corruption.  Not Wall Street by any means, but the same garbage applies.

"The Higher Education Act, in fact prohibits any compensation that includes incentives based on the number of students enrolling and doing so is considered a serious ethical breach by both NACAC
and IECA, and stands as grounds for dismissal for both. Last year the University of Phoenix was fined
$78 million for violating the provision." http://www.iecaonline.com/PDF/IECA_Insights_August-Sept10.pdf

And that's my take.

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

RIDGE CREEK SCHOOL ET AL "MEETING OF CREDITORS" BANKRUPTCY 11-75160-crm

Meeting of Creditors

Date: October 4, 2011 Time: 03:00 PM
Location: Third Floor − Room 366, Russell Federal Building, 75 Spring Street, SW, Atlanta, GA 30303
NOTICE TO DEBTOR(S): Individuals who file bankruptcy must bring two forms of original documentation to their meeting of creditors: photo identification (driver's license, government ID, state photo ID, student ID, U.S. passport, military ID, or resident alien card) and confirmation of their social security number. Additionally, you must provide the trustee whose name appears above with a copy of your most recently filed income tax return.This should be provided at least 7 days before the meeting of creditors. DO NOT FILE YOUR TAX RETURN WITH THE COURT. Please bring a copy of this notice with you to the Meeting of Creditors. Cellular phones and other devices with cameras will NOT be allowed in the building.

--------------------
A meeting of creditors is scheduled for the date, time and location listed on the front side. The debtor (both spouses in a joint case) must be present at the meeting to be questioned under oath by the trustee and by creditors. Creditors are welcome to attend, but are not required to do so. At the meeting, the creditors may elect a trustee other than the one named above, elect a committee of creditors, examine the debtor, and transact such other business as may properly come before the meeting. The meeting may be continued and concluded at a later date without further notice.




RIDGE CREEK SCHOOL/HIDDEN LAKE ACADEMY,INC.TO BE AUCTIONED - NOTICE OF POWER OF SALE

NOTICE OF POWER OF SALE

CONTAINED IN GEORGIA SECURITY DEED AND SECURITY AGREEMENT

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF LUMPKIN

Under and by virtue of the power of sale contained in that certain Georgia Security Deed and Security Agreement from HIDDEN LAKE ACADEMY, INC., a Georgia corporation (the “Grantor”) to BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, a North Carolina banking corporation (the “Original Lender”), dated September 19, 2006 and recorded in Deed Book 1005, Page 652, et seq., Lumpkin County, Georgia Records (the “Security Deed”) as such Security Deed was assigned to VFC PARTNERS 10 LLC, a Delaware limited liabilty company (the “Grantee”) pursuant to that certain Assignment of Security Instrument, recorded in Deed Book 1192, Page 693, aforesaid records, the undersigned, as Attorney-in-Fact for Grantor, will sell at public outcry to the highest and best bidder for cash, between the legal hours of sale before the Courthouse door of Lumpkin County, Georgia, on the first Tuesday in October, 2011 (October 4, 2011) the following described property, to wit:

PARCEL A:

ALL THAT TRACT OR PARCEL OF LAND lying and being in Land Lots 1002 and 1001, 11th District, 1st Section, Lumpkin County, Georgia, being 16.636 acres and shown as Parcel “A” on a survey for Hidden Lake Academy, dated August 11, 2006, prepared by Michael Stewart Kelley, Georgia Registered Land Surveyor, and being more particularly described as follows:

TO FIND THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, begin at an iron pin found at the corner common to Land Lots 1002, 1001, 1015 and 1016; thence along the southern boundary line of Land Lot 1002 North 86 04'02” West 349.39 feet to a point on the eastern right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road (40' right-of-way); thence North 86 04'02” West 41.22 feet to a point on the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence continuing along the southern boundary line of Land Lot 1002 North 86 04'03” West 536.81 feet to an iron pin found; thence leaving said Land Lot line North 13 01'46” East 47.26 feet to a point; thence North 13 53'51” East 71.19 feet to a point; thence North 30 57'19” East 45.05 feet to a point; thence North 38 55'11” East 42.55 feet to a point; thence North 30 10'19” East 21.40 feet to a point; thence North 28 56'46” East 47.32 feet to a point; thence North 15 52'20” East 39.14 feet to a point; thence North 01 13'35” West 67.19 feet to a point; thence North 03 22'07” West 72.67 feet to a point; thence North 05 41'49” West 32.65 feet to a point; thence North 05 58'55” East 48.33 feet to a point; thence North 16 02'45” East 87.18 feet to a point; thence North 21 29'13” East 53.58 feet to a point; thence North 28 03'21” East 14.25 feet to a point; thence North 31 19'24” East 92.80 feet to a point; thence North 31 40'00” East 71.80 feet to a point; thence North 21 32'15” East 35.01 feet to a point; thence North 11 08'06” East 77.90 feet to a point; thence North 15 21'54” East 67.70 feet to a point; thence North 16 04'32” East 110.87 feet to a point; thence North 23 10'49” East 54.61 feet to a point; thence North 21 40'14” East 66.51 feet to a point; thence North 26 25'52” East 88.41 feet to a point; thence North 12 08'23” East 98.58 feet to a point on the southern boundary line of Land Lot 943; running thence along said Land Lot line South 86 26'43” East 673.25 feet to a point on the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road; thence along said right-of-way the following chord bearings and distances: South 59 44'46” West 70.53 feet; South 49 35'15” West 108.28 feet; South 45 14'19” West 77.80 feet; South 35 44'10” West 77.29 feet; South 24 18'30” West 59.92 feet; South 19 29'20” West 113.58 feet; South 22 18'53” West 53.29 feet; South 29 14'49” West 76.46 feet; South 13 41'21” West 853.06 feet; thence South 17 53'48” West 22.17 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.

PARCEL B:

ALL THAT TRACT OR PARCEL OF LAND lying and being in Land Lots 1002, 1001, 944, 945, 946, and 1016, 11th District, 1st Section, Lumpkin County, Georgia, being 173.689 acres and shown as Parcel “B” on a survey for Hidden Lake Academy, dated August 11, 2006, prepared by Michael Stewart Kelley, Georgia Registered Land Surveyor, and being more particularly described as follows:

BEGINNING at the corner common to Land Lots 1001, 1002, 1015 and 1016; running thence along the southern boundary line of Land Lot 1002 North 86 04'02” West 349.39 feet to a point on the eastern right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road (40' right-of-way); thence along said right-of-way the following chord bearings and distances: North 17 53'46” East 13.69 feet; North 13 41'21” East 857.05 feet; North 29 14'53” East 73.42 feet; North 22 19'00” East 56.66 feet; North 19 29'18” East 112.92 feet; North 24 18'28” East 54.24 feet; North 35 44'03” East 69.94 feet; North 45 14'24” East 72.99 feet; North 49 35'17” East 103.19 feet; North 59 44'39” East 74.92 feet; North 58 16'40” East 100.40 feet; North 50 00'46” East 86.69 feet; North 43 14'11” East 63.46 feet; North 31 50'58” East 74.27 feet; North 32 52'01” East 38.01 feet; North 50 07'43” East 20.31 feet; North 68 03'05” East 5.97 feet; North 72 31'35” East 250.12 feet to a point; thence leaving the eastern right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road North 17 28'28” West 40.00 feet to a point on the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road; thence along the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road South 72 31'37” West 137.05 feet to a point; thence leaving the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road North 21 17'14” East 251.54 feet to a point; thence North 34 34'32” East 198.44 feet to a point; thence South 55 18'02” East 159.88 feet to a point; thence North 58 04'14” East 75.33 feet to a point; thence North 46 48'10” East 59.14 feet to a point; thence North 73 47'55” East 56.12 feet to a point; thence North 62 35'21” East 51.50 feet to a point; thence North 43 56'38” East 62.23 feet to a point; thence North 03 40'13” West 41.27 feet to a point; thence North 11 10'19” West 34.82 feet to a point; thence North 28 36'05” East 80.69 feet to a point; thence North 24 57'02” East 130.51 feet to a point; thence North 09 22'46” East 165.57 feet to a point; thence North 21 31'54” East 121.26 feet to a square pipe; thence South 84 07'17” East 335.01 feet to a point; thence South 84 13'14” East 2476.74 feet to an iron pin found; thence South 03 09'46” West 1293.38 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 87 22'01” West 1339.51 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 86 45'40” West 1299.58 feet to an iron pin found; thence South 03 42'34” West 1318.92 feet to a point; thence North 87 44'20” West 76.73 feet to a point; thence South 38 59'24” West 191.55 feet to a point; thence South 47 39'23” West 332.13 feet to a point; thence South 51 21'25” West 202.58 feet to a point; thence South 25 33'54” West 246.97 feet to a point; thence South 02 31'16” West 558.20 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 86 45'41” West 667.18 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 02 14'28” East 540.70 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 03 38'00” East 756.36 feet to an iron pin found and the POINT OF BEGINNING.

The above-described PARCEL A and PARCEL B are hereinafter referred to as the “Property”.

The Security Deed was given to secure Grantor's guarantee of a Promissory Note dated September 19, 2006, in the original principal amount of SEVEN MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($7,200,000.00) (the “Promissory Note”), pursuant to a Guaranty Agreement dated September 19, 2006 (the “Guaranty”), with interest thereon as provided in the Promissory Note and the Guaranty until paid, which Promissory Note and Guaranty were assigned to Grantee in connection with the assignment of the Security Deed.

On account of defaults in the terms of the Promissory Note, the Guaranty, the Security Deed and other loan documents, including Grantor's failure to pay the indebtedness in full at its accelerated maturity, Grantee, the present holder of the Security Deed, the Promissory Note and the Guaranty, has declared the entire unpaid principal balance of all obligations secured by the Security Deed, including interest to date of sale, to be due and payable immediately.

The debt remaining in default and unpaid, this sale will be for the purpose of satisfying the principal and interest due, amounts, if any, expended by Grantee to protect its interest in the Property, and all expenses of this sale, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees.

The Property will be sold subject to outstanding ad valorem taxes and/or assessments, and superior easements, restrictions and rights-of-way and other superior matters of record, if any. The undersigned will execute a deed to the purchaser at the sale as provided in the Security Deed.

To the best knowledge and belief of Grantee, the equitable title to the Property is vested in Grantor, and the party in possession of the Property is HLA, Inc., pursuant to a Commercial Lease Agreement referenced in Memorandum of Lease recorded in Deed Book X21, Page 118, Lumpkin County, Georgia Records.

VCF Partners 10, LLC, as Attorney-in-Fact for Hidden Lake Academy, Inc.

Kimberly S. Justus, Esq.

Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

Attorneys at Law

271 17th Street, N.W.

Suite 2400

Atlanta, Georgia 30363

(404) 879-2493

(9/7, 9/14, 9/21, 9/28)

Monday, September 26, 2011

ADVENTURE IN ADVOCACY: SEEKING GEORGIA AGENCY REFORMS/ACCOUNTABILITY BY FORMER VICTIMIZED FAMILIES OF THE RIDGE CREEK SCHOOL FACILITY AND HIDDEN LAKE ACADEMY, INC.'S PERPETUATED FRAUD; A STATE THAT SAT BACK AND DID NOTHING TO STOP THE HARM

There have been many inquiries made regarding our visit to Governor Deal’s Office and our meeting. Much thought was given whether to publish this as there was no gracious way to write it. Apparently, politically, Children's Rights and their safety does not matter, unless it is useful, or politically worthy of a coming election in a less than transparent bureaucracy.  For transparency, a synopsis of that day and meeting.

The Capitol Visit: Parents in advocacy.

Yesterday, I was blessed in advocacy with two parents of children that attended the former Ridge Creek School facility. For me, it was just over six years coming as my child attended the facility when it was Hidden Lake Academy; for them, it was two to six arduous, at times painful months.

I took a small rock to the meeting at the Capitol. It is small, black with shimmering flecks; it was a gift from my child, which was to be the last time that I would set foot on the grounds of the Hidden Lake facility and just before we pulled our child. It was all our child had to give; it connected us. The rock is carried everywhere; from time to time, it is taken out, and returned to its nesting place. Multi-faceted as we humans are, it was a symbol of strength, a bond of love, and an unwavering promise to seek the truth, to not only protect “the children left behind ,” but those children to come. I took that rock out and showed my friends in advocacy just before the meeting began. After the meeting, I decided the rock was worthy of the trip and my friends, but the “Capitol Gang” was not worthy of the rock.

It was a long trip to the Capitol, coming from out-of state. Reports were created, documents were collated, several distributed to the party/parties we were to meet with ahead of time. The volume of data sent was obviously limited as the complexity and volume of supporting documents were in thousands of pages; therefore, key issues were offered. We had thirty minutes, so it was imperative to send the documents ahead of time for review on the State’s end giving credence to our position and knowledge of why we were there; we were prepared.

Essentially, it was a promise, a labor of commitment in seeking help, justice, accountability by the State, and State agency reform so there would never be another Hidden Lake Academy, Ridge Creek School facility, or its affiliate entities running amok and doing what the facility pleased with children’s lives. Documents attest to the fact that this is a systemic problem within the Department of Human Services (DHS), to include the Office of Residential Child Care (ORCC), the Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS), and separately, the Department of Juvenile Justice ( DJJ), along with other state agencies that had no clue; thus, reforms are justified.

Prior to the Meeting:

A wise man asked me, “Is it better to be right or be happy?” “Happy” is far better I thought, but it will not make me happy if the truth is continuously obfuscated. Being placated was expected; anything above that curve would be a gift after dealing with every agency in Georgia whose representatives either appeared incompetent, circumvented the truth, or protected their turf. One must have faith, as it is about the safety of the children in Georgia’s care; who could turn that down? Therefore, I chose “happy.”

With our cell phones turned off (professional courtesy), the rock placed in safekeeping, we took a breath.

Governor Deal’s Chief of Staff greeted us. We entered a conference room and took our seats. Our briefcases were full of more documents including our laptops; professionally attired in suits, we were appropriately, yet apparently, overdressed.

The Meeting:

I thought it odd that the Chief of Staff had no documents to refer to or paper to write on. His face placid, already etched in boredom, we were asked who would like to begin and my colleague to the right began. Then the Chief of Staff interjected that he had never heard of the Ridge Creek School facility and that the first order of business after the meeting would be to check the licensing of the facility (which was previously provided in the State documents). “Happy” went out the window in front of me. A few minutes in, he rose, and left to summon a colleague, who was legal counsel. This was also odd because one usually ascertains the support group they will require before the meeting commences.

Less than thirty minutes and ticking:

They both returned and the legal counsel had a pad with which to take notes. I was relieved as the legal counsel exhibited human warmth and emotion. Early on, it was apparent that little, if any preparation was made on the part of the Chief of Staff. All the work that went into assuring he would be properly briefed for this meeting appeared to no avail. The conversation turned to the Office of the Child Advocate. In a curt, condescending manner, he stated he never heard of the Honorable Judge “Tom Rawlings” who was the previous Child Advocate from 2007 to 2009 in the State of Georgia (based out of Macon) before Ms. Melissa Carter (who resigned in 2010), then Ms.Tonya Boga was appointed by Governor Deal as Director. The Chief of Staff stated The Office of the Child Advocate was “new;” well, “new,” only in that the “Office” moved to Atlanta from Macon.

Re-iterating the truth conveyed to the Chief of Staff pertaining to our case:

At no time in either Administration did the Education Specialist in the Governor’s Office , or anyone else for that matter, refer parents or advocates to the Office of the Child Advocate ( the referral this year was on February 24, 2011 to Georgia’s Department of Education(DOE), which does not handle Child Caring Institutions, CCI’s). Next, it was suggested to contact a private attorney on March 29, 2011. Later, another parent was transferred to the Office of Consumer Affairs. From there, the parent was referred to the Post-Secondary Education Committee, which was ridiculous as the Ridge Creek facility is not a “school” in the State of Georgia, therefore no jurisdiction. The Chief of Staff’s rare response was not only to rebuff what was stated, but his demeanor conveyed boredom, arrogance, annoyance, nepotism, and flippant remarks. CNN on Capitol Hill would have had a field day with his glib reference to Italian-Americans (“Mafia”), and disparaging remarks toward the former Director of the ORS, now ORCC. Granted the former Director of the ORS was no cup of tea, probably deserving of scorn, but it was inappropriate. “Our apologies” would have sufficed.

The Meeting continued:

Key issues and facts were stated in the reports sent ahead of time; if the Chief of Staff bothered to read/prepare for the meeting, we would not have gone over the allotted time. We would not have had to address why we were sitting across from him. It would have been a 15-minute slam-dunk, five minutes each, their summation/recommendations, and brief rebuttal.

Meetings are streamlined because one prepares for them. You address the people sitting there in a gracious, dignified manner, so that the person you are addressing does not forget your name, because they are still in shock that you were not prepared properly or that clearly they are not respected. Perhaps a course at Disney University or one in humility would help one understand, “Mr. or Ms. Blank, we appreciate the preparation and concerns you have, I have reviewed the documents, and would like to address these concerns, ask some questions, then perhaps each of you could interject your thoughts and we work together for a solution. Obviously, your concerns relate to the system in place that you feel is broken and needs to be repaired, so let us work towards finding a solution.” It was an embarrassment to Governor Deal’s office and a shocking disappointment. Again, placation was expected, the lack of respect, and unpreparedness was inexcusable.

The meeting went over a few minutes with little response. The crème de la crème occurred in the latter part of the meeting, when the Chief of Staff’s phone continued to beep, then rang – a timer, the Governor? He excused himself again, stating that he had to take the call and left. Most likely, we have all been places where cell phones were not silenced, including our own. Embarrassment follows, akin to getting ones hand caught in the cookie jar, an apology, a few chuckles; even one of the Rector’s of our church has blushed on the pulpit by the ringing of his phone. That scenario would have been acceptable, even welcome as it is human, and affords for a little welcome levity.

The Chief of Staff returned and was brought up to speed on what he had missed; obviously much to his dismay as his facial expression remained deadpan and flushed. The meeting quickly ended, lucky for him, as his time was so valuable. Courtesy was extended offering that we appreciated his time, as it was “politically” appropriate.

Common decency and courtesy is not a difficult task. The only novices relating to this case sat before us. As for the rock, hidden away, its pores took in more fresh air than we did that afternoon.

Lessons in everything:

On the drive home, a truck hit debris, and a rock flew into my windshield. Thankfully, it did not totally breach the glass, but chipped it. I was reminded of the meeting. Anyone can attempt to chip away at another’s dignity and honor, but it only strengthens ones tenacity.

“Happy over being right,” in a Utopic world this might be an absolute. Although not practical and politically difficult, righting the wrongs in this case appears far more honorable.

        And that’s my take.

“For the Children Left Behind”
        I am, Jill Ryan.

Monday, September 19, 2011

RIDGE CREEK SCHOOL - HIDDEN LAKE ACADEMY, INC. - PUBLIC AUCTION OCTOBER 04, 2011

NOTICE OF POWER OF SALE

CONTAINED IN GEORGIA SECURITY DEED AND SECURITY AGREEMENT

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF LUMPKIN

Under and by virtue of the power of sale contained in that certain Georgia Security Deed and Security Agreement from HIDDEN LAKE ACADEMY, INC., a Georgia corporation (the “Grantor”) to BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY, a North Carolina banking corporation (the “Original Lender”), dated September 19, 2006 and recorded in Deed Book 1005, Page 652, et seq., Lumpkin County, Georgia Records (the “Security Deed”) as such Security Deed was assigned to VFC PARTNERS 10 LLC, a Delaware limited liabilty company (the “Grantee”) pursuant to that certain Assignment of Security Instrument, recorded in Deed Book 1192, Page 693, aforesaid records, the undersigned, as Attorney-in-Fact for Grantor, will sell at public outcry to the highest and best bidder for cash, between the legal hours of sale before the Courthouse door of Lumpkin County, Georgia, on the first Tuesday in October, 2011 (October 4, 2011) the following described property, to wit:

PARCEL A:

ALL THAT TRACT OR PARCEL OF LAND lying and being in Land Lots 1002 and 1001, 11th District, 1st Section, Lumpkin County, Georgia, being 16.636 acres and shown as Parcel “A” on a survey for Hidden Lake Academy, dated August 11, 2006, prepared by Michael Stewart Kelley, Georgia Registered Land Surveyor, and being more particularly described as follows:

TO FIND THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, begin at an iron pin found at the corner common to Land Lots 1002, 1001, 1015 and 1016; thence along the southern boundary line of Land Lot 1002 North 86 04'02” West 349.39 feet to a point on the eastern right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road (40' right-of-way); thence North 86 04'02” West 41.22 feet to a point on the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence continuing along the southern boundary line of Land Lot 1002 North 86 04'03” West 536.81 feet to an iron pin found; thence leaving said Land Lot line North 13 01'46” East 47.26 feet to a point; thence North 13 53'51” East 71.19 feet to a point; thence North 30 57'19” East 45.05 feet to a point; thence North 38 55'11” East 42.55 feet to a point; thence North 30 10'19” East 21.40 feet to a point; thence North 28 56'46” East 47.32 feet to a point; thence North 15 52'20” East 39.14 feet to a point; thence North 01 13'35” West 67.19 feet to a point; thence North 03 22'07” West 72.67 feet to a point; thence North 05 41'49” West 32.65 feet to a point; thence North 05 58'55” East 48.33 feet to a point; thence North 16 02'45” East 87.18 feet to a point; thence North 21 29'13” East 53.58 feet to a point; thence North 28 03'21” East 14.25 feet to a point; thence North 31 19'24” East 92.80 feet to a point; thence North 31 40'00” East 71.80 feet to a point; thence North 21 32'15” East 35.01 feet to a point; thence North 11 08'06” East 77.90 feet to a point; thence North 15 21'54” East 67.70 feet to a point; thence North 16 04'32” East 110.87 feet to a point; thence North 23 10'49” East 54.61 feet to a point; thence North 21 40'14” East 66.51 feet to a point; thence North 26 25'52” East 88.41 feet to a point; thence North 12 08'23” East 98.58 feet to a point on the southern boundary line of Land Lot 943; running thence along said Land Lot line South 86 26'43” East 673.25 feet to a point on the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road; thence along said right-of-way the following chord bearings and distances: South 59 44'46” West 70.53 feet; South 49 35'15” West 108.28 feet; South 45 14'19” West 77.80 feet; South 35 44'10” West 77.29 feet; South 24 18'30” West 59.92 feet; South 19 29'20” West 113.58 feet; South 22 18'53” West 53.29 feet; South 29 14'49” West 76.46 feet; South 13 41'21” West 853.06 feet; thence South 17 53'48” West 22.17 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.

PARCEL B:

ALL THAT TRACT OR PARCEL OF LAND lying and being in Land Lots 1002, 1001, 944, 945, 946, and 1016, 11th District, 1st Section, Lumpkin County, Georgia, being 173.689 acres and shown as Parcel “B” on a survey for Hidden Lake Academy, dated August 11, 2006, prepared by Michael Stewart Kelley, Georgia Registered Land Surveyor, and being more particularly described as follows:

BEGINNING at the corner common to Land Lots 1001, 1002, 1015 and 1016; running thence along the southern boundary line of Land Lot 1002 North 86 04'02” West 349.39 feet to a point on the eastern right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road (40' right-of-way); thence along said right-of-way the following chord bearings and distances: North 17 53'46” East 13.69 feet; North 13 41'21” East 857.05 feet; North 29 14'53” East 73.42 feet; North 22 19'00” East 56.66 feet; North 19 29'18” East 112.92 feet; North 24 18'28” East 54.24 feet; North 35 44'03” East 69.94 feet; North 45 14'24” East 72.99 feet; North 49 35'17” East 103.19 feet; North 59 44'39” East 74.92 feet; North 58 16'40” East 100.40 feet; North 50 00'46” East 86.69 feet; North 43 14'11” East 63.46 feet; North 31 50'58” East 74.27 feet; North 32 52'01” East 38.01 feet; North 50 07'43” East 20.31 feet; North 68 03'05” East 5.97 feet; North 72 31'35” East 250.12 feet to a point; thence leaving the eastern right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road North 17 28'28” West 40.00 feet to a point on the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road; thence along the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road South 72 31'37” West 137.05 feet to a point; thence leaving the western right-of-way of Hidden Lake Road North 21 17'14” East 251.54 feet to a point; thence North 34 34'32” East 198.44 feet to a point; thence South 55 18'02” East 159.88 feet to a point; thence North 58 04'14” East 75.33 feet to a point; thence North 46 48'10” East 59.14 feet to a point; thence North 73 47'55” East 56.12 feet to a point; thence North 62 35'21” East 51.50 feet to a point; thence North 43 56'38” East 62.23 feet to a point; thence North 03 40'13” West 41.27 feet to a point; thence North 11 10'19” West 34.82 feet to a point; thence North 28 36'05” East 80.69 feet to a point; thence North 24 57'02” East 130.51 feet to a point; thence North 09 22'46” East 165.57 feet to a point; thence North 21 31'54” East 121.26 feet to a square pipe; thence South 84 07'17” East 335.01 feet to a point; thence South 84 13'14” East 2476.74 feet to an iron pin found; thence South 03 09'46” West 1293.38 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 87 22'01” West 1339.51 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 86 45'40” West 1299.58 feet to an iron pin found; thence South 03 42'34” West 1318.92 feet to a point; thence North 87 44'20” West 76.73 feet to a point; thence South 38 59'24” West 191.55 feet to a point; thence South 47 39'23” West 332.13 feet to a point; thence South 51 21'25” West 202.58 feet to a point; thence South 25 33'54” West 246.97 feet to a point; thence South 02 31'16” West 558.20 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 86 45'41” West 667.18 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 02 14'28” East 540.70 feet to an iron pin found; thence North 03 38'00” East 756.36 feet to an iron pin found and the POINT OF BEGINNING.

The above-described PARCEL A and PARCEL B are hereinafter referred to as the “Property”.

The Security Deed was given to secure Grantor's guarantee of a Promissory Note dated September 19, 2006, in the original principal amount of SEVEN MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/HUNDREDTHS DOLLARS ($7,200,000.00) (the “Promissory Note”), pursuant to a Guaranty Agreement dated September 19, 2006 (the “Guaranty”), with interest thereon as provided in the Promissory Note and the Guaranty until paid, which Promissory Note and Guaranty were assigned to Grantee in connection with the assignment of the Security Deed.

On account of defaults in the terms of the Promissory Note, the Guaranty, the Security Deed and other loan documents, including Grantor's failure to pay the indebtedness in full at its accelerated maturity, Grantee, the present holder of the Security Deed, the Promissory Note and the Guaranty, has declared the entire unpaid principal balance of all obligations secured by the Security Deed, including interest to date of sale, to be due and payable immediately.

The debt remaining in default and unpaid, this sale will be for the purpose of satisfying the principal and interest due, amounts, if any, expended by Grantee to protect its interest in the Property, and all expenses of this sale, including, without limitation, attorneys' fees.

The Property will be sold subject to outstanding ad valorem taxes and/or assessments, and superior easements, restrictions and rights-of-way and other superior matters of record, if any. The undersigned will execute a deed to the purchaser at the sale as provided in the Security Deed.

To the best knowledge and belief of Grantee, the equitable title to the Property is vested in Grantor, and the party in possession of the Property is HLA, Inc., pursuant to a Commercial Lease Agreement referenced in Memorandum of Lease recorded in Deed Book X21, Page 118, Lumpkin County, Georgia Records.

VCF Partners 10, LLC, as Attorney-in-Fact for Hidden Lake Academy, Inc.

Kimberly S. Justus, Esq.

Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC

Attorneys at Law

271 17th Street, N.W.

Suite 2400

Atlanta, Georgia 30363

(404) 879-2493

(9/7, 9/14, 9/21, 9/28)

Friday, September 9, 2011

BREAKING NEWS - RIDGE CREEK SCHOOL - BANKRUPTCY DEJA VU...

Case number 11-75160-crm Chapter 7 filed on 09-01-2011 in US Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia. It is rather 'colorful' reading. Perhaps the new US Trustee, this time around, will 'get' it right.

Already, the 94 page filing is being torn to shreds ...

The rest, well, "colorful" might just be an understatement.